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HERE IN MY CAR:
THE CROSSING OF MIRANDA AND TERRY AT
THE INTERSECTION OF CUSTODY DURING
STOPS
CHRISTOPHER LYNCH
INTRODUCTION
The late George Carlin famously joked about the seven words banned by
the FCCI, but seven words most Americans would rather not hear are,
"You have the right to remain silent."2 The constant barrage of television
shows and movies about police officers has ensured that most people know
those are usually the first words one hears when being arrested. 3
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees American citizens
the right against self incrimination. 4 It was from the Fifth Amendment that
the Court formulated the Miranda warning in the 1968 decision Miranda v.
Arizona.5 The Miranda warning must be given to a criminal suspect before
a custodial interrogation. 6 A suspect is in custody when he has been
I See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1978) (discussing a radio broadcast of the
George Carlin monologue entitled Filthy Words); see also Transcript of Filthy Words, http://www.law.
umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/filthywords.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010) (featuring a
transcript of the original monologue performed by the late George Carlin).
2 See Eric Longley, The Miranda Warning, ST. JAMES ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POP CULTURE, 2002,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_glepc/is-tov/ai 2419100811 (last visited Mar. 10, 2010) (pointing
to Americans' association of the Miranda warning with arrest because of popular media
representations).
3 Id. (mentioning how "[m]ovies, television police dramas, and 'real' cop shows" have familiarized
many with the Miranda warnings); see also Premature Miranda Warnings: Mirandizing Too Soon Can
be a Mistake, http://www.policemag.com/Channel/Patrol/Articles/2009/12/Premature-Miranda-
Wamings.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2010) (discussing that television shows and movies often distort
the true meaning of Miranda warnings).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself').
5 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966) (describing information the warning must provide).
6 Id. at 444 (summarizing the Court's holding that "procedural safeguards" must be used to ensure
that the rights of citizens are respected).
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"deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."7
Though it has been defined by the Court, the question as to when a
person has entered into police custody is one that still comes up today.8 In
New Mexico v. Snell, the state of New Mexico appealed a ruling by the
New Mexico Court of Appeals which held that a suspect was in custody
when he was placed into the back seat of a police cruiser and asked about
the car accident with which he had just been involved. 9 The point at which
a person may enter into police custody during a routine traffic stop, or if a
person can even enter into custody in that context, is a source of much
confusion among the courts, and courts are split about whether the placing
of a suspect into a police cruiser for questioning amounts to a custodial
interrogation.' 0
It is important that the courts come to a consensus on what police
conduct renders a suspect in custody; without a consensus, custody
determinations will be confused, thus hindering the efficiency of the
nation's courts and law enforcement officers.11 Officers need to know
when to recite the Miranda warning to suspects, or potential suspects, so
that any evidence obtained through the questioning can be admitted in court
as direct evidence. 12 It is particularly important that officers be aware of
custody in the context of routine traffic stops because they are such a
common exercise for this country's law enforcement officers.13
7 Id
8 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, New Mexico v. Snell, 2008 WL 3833284 (2008) (No. 08-
196) (calling the "relationship between Terry and Miranda in the context of traffic investigations . .. a
recurring issue of nationwide importance"); see Katherine M. Swift, Comment, Drawing a Line
between Terry and Miranda: The Degree and Duration of Restraint, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1075, 1080
(2006) (describing the current use of different tests and the existing circuit split regarding when a
suspect is in custody).
9 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Snell, 2008 WL 3833284 (No. 08-196).
10 Id. at 12 ("Numerous courts have addressed the custody requirement of Miranda in the context
of brief questioning in a patrol car, with greatly varying results").
1 See Swift, supra note 8, at 1080 (describing the current use of different tests and the splits
among courts as to custody as "unpredictable and inconsistent"); Thomas P. Windom, Note, The
Writing on The Wall: Miranda's "Prior Criminal Experience" Exception, 92 VA. L. REv. 327, 338
(stating that several factors are relevant to custody evaluation, and no one factor is necessarily
dispositive).
12 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) (asserting that the warning is a prerequisite to
the admissibility of statements made by a suspect during custodial interrogation); George C. Thomas
III, Article, The End of The Road For Miranda v. Arizona?: On The History and Future of Rules For
Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 9 (2000) (stating that police must give suspects a
Miranda warning before any evidence gained through police questioning can be admitted against the
suspect).
13 See American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association, The Traffic Stop,
http://www.adtsea.iup.edu/adtsea/articles/Article.aspx?ArticlelD=7b876663-3cfe-4254-a946-
dbc38805d8c6 (last visited November 30, 2008) (stating that in 1999, fifty-two percent of all contacts
made by the public with the police were traffic stops); Windom, supra note I1, at 338-39 (discussing
that police conducting routine traffic stops "need not give Miranda warnings to a detained motorist
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This note argues that, in the context of the routine traffic stop, once the
situation becomes one in which there is a crime beyond that for which the
officer stopped the motorist becomes apparent, such as vehicular homicide
when the stop was the result of an accident, then the law enforcement
officer must issue the Miranda warning. Failure to recite the warning
would render questions related to that further crime inadmissible, thus
preventing officers from utilizing a back door method to interrogate
motorists.
The first part of this note discusses the background of the confusion
regarding cases that seem to touch upon both the doctrine formulated in
Miranda, and that devised in Terry v. Ohio. The second part of the note
discusses the different approaches taken to delineating custody used by
different courts throughout the country. The third part argues that in order
to balance the need for effective law enforcement and the rights of
American citizens when determining custody, the Court should utilize a
tiered test that begins with the hallmark of a formal arrest test, and then
moves to a totality of the circumstances test. In the case of a routine traffic
stop, though, a third test should be applied before the other two that holds
that once a greater crime is present and the officer wishes to ask questions
related to it, Miranda must be recited; that approach is then applied to the
facts of Snell.
I. BACKGROUND
Miranda v. Arizona is the case in which the Supreme Court formulated
the warning that bears Miranda's name. 14 The warning must be given
before a custodial interrogation. 15 In Terry, the Court established that the
'stop and frisk,' or Terry stop, is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable search and seizure. 16 The Court did not mention
Miranda in its Terry decision, as it did not see it as a case that touched
upon custody.17 The Court further held, in Berkemer v. McCarty, that a
routine traffic stop is more like a Terry stop and thus does not require a
Miranda warning. 18 However, in its decision, the Court held that a traffic
during questioning pursuant to the stop," however, police must be aware of custody laws, because the
routine traffic stop conversation may lead to a custodial interrogation).
14 See Longley, supra note 2 (describing the origin of the Miranda warning).
15 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68 (stating that a suspect must be informed of his rights before
custodial interrogation).
16 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17 Id.
18 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,440 (1984).
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stop can, given the right circumstances, render a motorist in custody.19
During the 1980's, the scope of the Terry doctrine was expanded by the
lower federal courts. This expansion has led to a feeling of confusion
among the courts about the applicability of Terry and Miranda in situations
that seem to touch on both doctrines. 20 This confusion has led to a split
among the circuits. 21
A. Miranda and the Warning
a. The Case of Ernesto Miranda
Ernesto Miranda was arrested on March 13, 1963, and taken to a police
station in Phoenix, Arizona. 22 The complaining witness identified him, and
he was placed into one of the precinct's interrogation rooms. 23 Two police
officers interrogated him for roughly two hours, and the interrogation
produced a written confession signed by Miranda. 24 At no time was
Miranda informed that he had the right to an attorney. 25 The confession,
however, included a typed paragraph stating that Miranda was fully aware
of all of his legal rights when he wrote it.26 The Arizona Supreme Court, in
allowing the confession to be admitted as evidence in Miranda's trial,
emphasized the fact that Miranda had not specifically requested counsel. 27
b. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Court held that the interrogation of Miranda violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self incrimination. 28 It further held that in order
to avoid violating citizens' Fifth Amendment rights, police must initiate
procedural safeguards that effectively warn a suspect of his rights before
conducting a custodial interrogation. 29 The Court stated that a suspect must
19 Id. (maintaining that the protections of Miranda apply to a motorist who has been taken into
custody).
20 See Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63
FORDHAM L. REv. 715, 716 (1994) (discussing how a series of cases decided by the lower federal
courts caused the doctrines of Terry and Miranda to clash).
21 Id. (proposing a solution the author feels would harmonize the different approaches taken by the
circuits).
22 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966).
23 Id
24 Id. at 491-92.
25 Id. at 491.
26 Id at 492.
27 Id
28 Id
29 Id (holding that Miranda was not informed of his rights to the extent that he could knowingly
waive them).
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be informed of his right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, and that he has the right to an attorney, either
retained or appointed.30 The failure of law enforcement officers to issue the
warning before a custodial interrogation causes any evidence produced
from such an interrogation to be rendered inadmissible in court as direct
evidence. 31
c. Custodial Interrogation
The warning must be given before a custodial interrogation, and the
Court has defined both custody32 and interrogation.33 In Miranda, the
Court defined custody as a "deprivation of a person's freedom of action in
any significant way." 34 The Court elaborated on the definition of custody in
California v. Beheler, holding that in terms of custody "the ultimate inquiry
is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." 35
Interrogation was defined by the Court in Rhode Island v. Innis as "either
express questioning or its functional equivalent."36 The Court went on to
say that interrogation is not limited to express questioning, but that it also
includes words or actions of the police, which are not part of a normal
arrest and custody, "that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."37
B. Terry and the Stop and Frisk
a. The Case of John Terry
On Halloween, in 1963, at around 2:30 PM, a police detective in
Cleveland witnessed some men behaving suspiciously. 38 Two of the men,
Chilton and Terry, were standing on a corner; they took turns walking past
30 Id. (pointing to the fact that Miranda was neither informed of his right to counsel, nor to his right
to remain silent).
31 Id. (asserting that the evidence obtained from the interrogation of Miranda was inadmissible).
32 Id. at 492, 444 (defining the meaning of custodial interrogation).
33 See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-02 (1980) (concluding that "the Miranda
safeguards come into play
whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent").
34 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
35 See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983).
36 See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02.
37 Id
38 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968) (noting the arresting officer's statements that although
he was not sure why the men drew his attention at first, his thirty years of patrol experience led him to
be suspicious of them).
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a store down the street and returning to the corner. During the five or six
trips each man made, he would look into the store, walk a little past it, turn
around, walk past the store again, and then confer with the other when he
returned to the corner.39 At one point, a third man, Katz, walked up to them
at the corner, spoke to them for a few minutes, and then continued on his
way.40 Soon after, Terry and Chilton began to walk in the same direction
that Katz had gone.4 1 The detective followed them and saw the three men
meet up in front of another store; at this point he approached them and
identified himself as a police officer.42
The behavior of the men led the detective to believe they were planning
a daytime robbery of the store Chilton and Terry had walked past several
times. 43 Since that type of crime usually involves weapons, the detective
believed the men could be armed. 44 He grabbed one of the men, turned him
around, and frisked him outside of his clothes. 45 He did the same to the
other men, before reaching into the clothes of two of them to remove their
guns. 46 Katz did not have a gun, so the detective did not go beyond patting
down his outer clothing.47
b. The Supreme Court's Decision
The men argued that the officer's conduct had violated their Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.48 The Court
pointed out that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid all searches and
seizures, but only unreasonable ones. 49 Further, the Court stated that "in
determining whether the seizure and search were 'unreasonable' our
inquiry is a dual one-whether the officer's action was justified at its
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."5 0 The
39 Id. at 6.
40 Id
41 Id
42 Id. at 6-7
43 Id
44 Id
45 Id at 7
46 Id. After patting down Terry outside, the officer then directed the three men to enter a store,
where he then patted down the remaining two men and removed one gun from Terry, and another gun
from one of the other men. Id.
47 Id
48 Id. at 8 (stating that certiorari was granted to decide whether the admission of the guns violated
the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights).
49 Id. at 9.
50 Id. at 20-21.
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Court noted that there is no test for reasonableness, and that determining
reasonableness requires the balancing of the police officer's need to search
or seize with the level of invasion upon the individual. 51
In order to justify an intrusion upon a citizen, an officer "must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 52 The Court
noted that a police officer, whose job is already dangerous, should not have
to make it even more so by taking unnecessary risks.53 It would be an
unnecessary risk to prohibit an officer, who is "justified in believing that
the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range
is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others," from
determining whether that person is, in fact, a danger, and if so, to neutralize
that danger. 54
It is important to note that the Court did not mention Miranda at all in
the Terry decision, and there was no question of custody.55 Terry was only
about the reasonableness of a search and seizure pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment. 56 Miranda, on the other hand, was about a suspect who was in
police custody and was not informed of his Fifth Amendment rights. 57 It
may now seem to have been inevitable, but eventually the two cases
intersected in Berkemer v. McCarty.58
C. Berkemer at the Intersection of Terry and Miranda
a. The Case of Rick McCarty (Berkemer)
An Ohio highway patrolman followed a car for approximately two miles
after he noticed it swerving in and out of a lane, so he followed it for
approximately two miles. 59 The patrolman then signaled to the driver of the
swerving car to stop.60 The driver, McCarty, was told to exit the car; when
he complied, he was barely able to stand.61 The patrolman concluded that
51 Id. at 21.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 24 (stating it would be unreasonable to prevent officers from taking action in potentially
dangerous situations).
54 Id.
55 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968)
56 Id. at 4.
57 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
59 Id at 423.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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McCarty was intoxicated. 62 He decided to charge McCarty with an offense
and did not permit him to leave. 63
He then asked McCarty if he had been drinking or using drugs, to which
McCarty replied in the affirmative. 64 It was at this point that the patrolman
placed McCarty under arrest. 65 He transported McCarty to the police
station and there continued to question him.66 He had not yet, however,
recited the Miranda warning to McCarty.67
b. The Court's Decision
The Court held that McCarty should have been read the Miranda
warning at the time he was placed under formal arrest.68 The Court held,
however, that the questioning that occurred before the arrest did not qualify
as a custodial interrogation. 69 The Court reasoned that a routine traffic stop,
such as the one that took place in Berkemer, was more akin to a Terry stop
because detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively
temporary and brief, and because circumstances associated with the typical
traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of
the police. 70
The Court went on to hold that a Miranda warning would be required,
though, if the conduct of the police placed the driver in custody for
practical purposes. 71
II. THE CURRENT TESTS
In the wake of Berkemer, a split among the circuits developed. 72 Several
of the circuits, namely the First, Fourth, and Eighth, took the holding in
Berkemer to mean that a reasonable Terry stop, even a coercive one, did
62 Id.
63 Id
64 Id. McCarty admitted that he had consumed two beers and had smoked several joints of
marijuana shortly before the traffic stop.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See id. at 424. Neither Williams nor anyone else told McCarty that he had a right to remain
silent, to consult with an attorney, and to have an attorney appointed for him if he could not afford one.
68 See id. at 434-35 (stating that there is no question as to whether a suspect is in custody after a
formal arrest).
69 Id. at 441.
70 Id at 437-39 (concluding that those factors "mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be
induced to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely").
71 Id. at 440 (clarifying that the "full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda" will be
available to motorists placed in custody).
72 See Swift, supra note 8, at 1084 (describing Berkemer's holding leading to a "simultaneous
contraction of Miranda and expansion of Terry").
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not require a Miranda warning.73 These circuit courts essentially expanded
the scope of the Terry stop to include police actions that would traditionally
have been considered custody.74 Other circuits, such as the Second,
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth, found that a reasonable Terry stop situation
could escalate into a Miranda situation, but there is a further split regarding
how that point is to be determined. 75
Of the circuits that hold a Terry stop can escalate into a Miranda
situation, there seem to be two types of tests applied to figure out when a
stop becomes custody: one is the hallmark of a formal arrest test,76 and the
other is the totality of the circumstances test. 77 There is, for the most part,
not a clear delineation between the two, and the two tests have even been
used in tandem.78 The result is confusion among the courts, and among
law enforcement officers who must try to figure out when the Miranda
warning is applicable so that evidence will not be deemed inadmissible at
trial. 79
A. Hallmark of a Formal Arrest
The hallmark of a formal arrest test holds that a suspect is in custody for
purposes of Miranda when he is subject to police action that is the hallmark
of a formal arrest.80 The hallmarks of a formal arrest are those police
actions most associated with formal arrest. 81 Handcuffs are most certainly a
73 Id. at 1084-85 (noting that "[s]ome lower courts have interpreted Berkemer to mean that
Miranda warnings are never necessary for a lawful Terry stop").
74 Id. at 1086 (pointing out that those courts that find reasonable Terry stops as noncustodial "do
not focus on the coercive nature of police behavior" during those stops).
75 Id. at 1087 (describing the approaches taken by the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth circuits,
who have found reasonable Terry stops to be custodial).
76 See United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676-77 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the use of
handcuffs are a "hallmark of a formal arrest" and thus the suspect was in custody).
77 See Swift, supra note 8, at 1088 (claiming that courts have tried and failed to determine
precisely when Terry stops become custodial and have "settled for vague totality of the circumstances"
tests).
78 See United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463-67 (10th Cir. 1993) (taking into account factors
the court deemed are associated with formal arrest in determining that the totality of the circumstances
pointed to custody).
79 See Note, Custodial Engineering: Cleaning Up the Scope of Miranda Custody During Coercive
Terry Stops, 108 HARv. L. REv. 665, 665 (1995) ("Incriminating statements made after the police issue
a Miranda warning are presumptively admissible at trial; those made during a custodial interrogation
before the warning are not."). David S. Romantz, "You Have the Right To Remain Silent": A Case For
the Use of Silence as Substantive Proof of the Criminal Defendant's Guilt, 38 IND. L. REv. 1, 10-15
(2005) (discussing the admissibility of incriminating statements made before and after Miranda
warnings).
80 See Newton, 369 F.3d at 676 (maintaining that actions of police, like telling suspect he is not
under arrest, must be measured against "the extent to which a reasonable person would understand any
restraints on his freedom to be comparable to those associated with a formal arrest").
81 See Perdue, 8 F.3d atl464-65 (deeming "the use of guns to force a suspect off the road, out of
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hallmark of the formal arrest.82 Another hallmark would be the drawing of
a gun on a suspect, along with being placed into a police vehicle, and being
forced to lie on the ground.83 Contrast those police actions with the
hovering of helicopters overhead in United States v. Perdue, which is not
associated with the typical, formal arrest. 84
a. The Test Applied
The Second Circuit utilized a hallmark of a formal arrest test in US. v.
Newton.85 In that case, a parole officer received a call regarding a parolee
who told his mother that he had a gun and threatened to kill her and her
husband. 86 Three police officers and three parole officers went to the
apartment and handcuffed the parolee, telling him that it was for his safety
as well as that of the officers. 87 The officers sat him in a chair near the front
door to the apartment, and one of them asked him if there was any
contraband in the apartment.88 The parolee nodded toward a shoebox; when
asked about its contents, he answered that there was a gun inside the box.89
The court decided that there was custody in that situation because of the
use of the handcuffs, a hallmark of a formal arrest.90
B. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
The other test, used more often by the circuits, is the totality of the
circumstances test.91 A court applying this test will take into consideration
a number of factors, which:
may include any combination of the following: (1) the location of the
encounter and whether it was familiar to the suspect, or at least neutral
his car, and onto the ground ... a type of police conduct" akin to a formal arrest).
82 See U.S. v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676 (2d Cir. 2004) (pointing out that handcuffs are generally
considered a hallmark of a formal arrest).
83 See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464-65 (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983))
(asserting that being forced from one's car at gunpoint is conduct akin to a formal arrest).
84 Id. at 1464 (taking into account the hovering helicopters in utilizing the totality of the
circumstances test).
85 See Newton, 369 F.3d at 676 (holding that the suspect was in custody for purposes of Miranda
because he was handcuffed).
86 Id at 663.
87 Id
88 Id
89 Id at 663-64.
90 Id at 677 ("[W]e must conclude that handcuffing Newton, though reasonable to the officers'
investigatory purpose under the Fourth Amendment, nevertheless placed him in custody for purposes of
Miranda.").
91 See Swift, supra note 8, at 1088 (citing the courts' inability to differentiate between a Terry stop
and Miranda custody as the reason the courts utilize a totality of the circumstances test).
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or public; (2) the number of officers questioning the suspect; (3) the
degree of physical restraint used to detain the suspect; (4) the duration
and character of the interrogation; (5) the language used to summon
the suspect; (6) the extent to which the suspect is confronted with
evidence of guilt; and (7) whether the suspect initiated contact with
the police. 92
This list is not definitive, as courts may look at other factors, and none of
the factors listed are dispositive.93
a. The Totality Test Applied
The Ninth Circuit utilized a totality of the circumstances test in United
States v. Kim.94 The court focused on five factors to determine whether
there was custody; those factors were, "(1) the language used to summon
the individual; (2) the extent to which the defendant is confronted with
evidence of guilt; (3) the physical surroundings of the interrogation;(4) the
duration of the detention; (5) and the degree of pressure applied to detain
the individual." 95
In Kim, a Korean woman was worried about her son, who was working
alone in their family business, after a detective came by her home asking
about a former resident.96 She went up to the business and found it
surrounded by police.97 She knocked on the door and an officer let her in;
the officer quickly shut the door behind her and locked it before her
husband could follow her.98 Once inside, she was kept there for roughly
three hours, questioned on and off, and situated so that there were police
officers between her and the exit.99 She was also instructed to shut up when
she spoke Korean, and then instructed to only speak in English.100 Relying
on the totality of the circumstances test, the court found that she was in
custody for purposes of Miranda and should have been informed of her
rights. 101
92 Id. at 1080.
93 Id. (adding that courts always point out that the factors viewed are neither dispositive nor
exhaustive); United States v. Galceran, 301 F.3d 927, 929-930 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that the factors
listed are neither dispositive nor exhaustive).
94 292 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2002) (deciding that in order to determine whether a person was in
custody, a court must look at all of the circumstances surrounding the questioning).
95 Id. at 974.
96 Id. at 971.
97 Id.
98 Id
99 Id. at 972.
100 Id. at 971.
101 Id. at 978 (concluding that under a totality of the circumstances test, suspect was in custody).
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C. Combining the Tests
The Tenth Circuit has found that a suspect was in custody by utilizing a
combination of the two tests. 102 In U.S. v. Perdue, the Tenth Circuit held
that a suspect who was forced out of his truck at gunpoint, separated from
his pregnant fianc6e, and forced to lie face down on the ground in the
presence of several officers while helicopters hovered overhead was in
custody for Miranda purposes.10 3 The situation in Perdue featured both
hallmarks of a formal arrest, such as drawn guns and a suspect being forced
to lie on the ground, and circumstances that would be taken into account by
a court utilizing the totality of the circumstances test, such as the hovering
helicopters. Helicopters are rarely used in arrests, and thus their presence
would not constitute a hallmark of a formal arrest. The court noted that
being forced off the road and out of a vehicle onto the ground at gunpoint is
more like a formal arrest, and took that into consideration when evaluating
the totality of the circumstances faced by the suspect.104
D. Confusion Among the Courts
The utilization by the courts of different tests, or combinations of the
tests, has created a situation in which there is no clear answer as to what
constitutes custody.105 In its holding in Miranda, the Court believed that its
definition of custody would be an easy one to understand, both for the
courts and for law enforcement.106 That is no longer the case, and a new
test must be established.107 As Mark A. Godsey notes in When Terry Met
Miranda: Two Constitutional Doctrines Collide, a test should be judged as
to "how well it protects civil liberties and enforces the Constitution . . . how
effectively it does so without substantially undermining law enforcement
102 See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464-65 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that some of the police actions taken
against the suspect were akin to a formal arrest).
103 Id. at 1464 (noting that the officers employed an amount of force that crossed the line between
a Terry stop and an unconstitutional arrest).
104 Id. at 1465 (finding that a person in the suspect's position "would have felt 'completely at the
mercy of the police').
105 See Swift, supra note 8, at 1080 (stating that the ad hoc nature of custody tests has made
custody determinations "unpredictable and inconsistent"); See generally Cruz v Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 84-
86 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the difficulty of making
custody determinations).
106 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 432 (1984) (citing the simplicity and clarity of the
Court's decision in Miranda); See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465.
107 See Swift, supra note 8, at 1080-81 (discussing the difficulty courts face in determining
custody, and the inconsistencies that have resulted); See United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1095-96
(7th Cir. 1993) (noting that courts have identified different factors in determining whether police action
constituted a stop or an arrest).
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efforts ... and whether it avoids extreme complexity so that police officers
can realistically be expected to apply it accurately in real world
situations." 08
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
This note proposes a test that does not drastically depart from the tests
currently being applied, which are flawed only in that they lead to much
confusion. 109 So this note's proposal will try to streamline them, and
combine them into a coherent standard. First, courts should look to
whether any of the hallmarks of a formal arrest were present during the
period of questioning. 110 If the answer is yes, then courts should hold that
the suspect was in custody. It is widely understood that the job of the law
enforcement officer is a dangerous one, so there is an exception to ensure
that it does not have to be any more dangerous than it already is. 111 The
exception is that police can utilize the hallmarks of formal arrest - in this
case drawn guns would presumably be the most common hallmark - in a
situation they believe is dangerous; but, once the situation is under control,
they must relinquish the hallmark in order to prevent rendering the
individual in custody. 112 That said, questions asked while the hallmark is in
place would be custodial.
A person can be in a custodial situation, however, despite a lack of any
hallmarks of formal arrest. 113 Courts should then look, to the totality of the
circumstances. This test, however, should be trimmed down from the
hodgepodge of factors considered by the circuits into a leaner, easier to
108 See Godsey, supra note 20, at 733-34.
109 See id., at 732 (stating that "no universal, disciplined method exists for measuring when such a
stop is converted into an arrest"); see also Swift, supra note 8, at 1103 (concluding that proposed test is
desirable because it will limit confusion surrounding custody).
110 See, e.g., U.S. v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676 (2d Cir. 2004) (calling handcuffs a hallmark of a
formal arrest).
111 See Thomas Gerry Bufkin, Terry and Miranda: The Conflict Between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, 18 Miss. C. L. REv. 199, 200-01 (noting that police
officers' are frequently called on to investigate potentially dangerous, suspicious characters); Jenny
Rachel Macht, Should Police Misconduct Files be Public Record? Why Internal Affairs Investigations
and Citizens Complaints Should be Open to Public Scrutiny, 45 CRM. L. BULL. 5 (stating that "[p]olice
work is one of the most dangerous jobs in our society").
112 See U.S. v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464-65 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that drawn guns are akin to a
formal arrest); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (finding that Miranda protections apply
when a traffic stop escalates and the motorist is deemed "in custody").
113 See U.S. v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that "surround[ing] Kim to make
her feel that she could not leave the store, the position of the officers, the fact that they locked Kim's
husband out of their store, their restriction of her communication with her son, and their orders as to
what language she should speak and when and where she could sit, combined with the length and nature
of the questioning" created custody); United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, 580 (noting that
psychological restraints may be just as binding as those that are physical).
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apply test. 114
Finally, this note's departure from typical solutions is in its proposed test
to be applied to routine traffic Stops.115 The unique nature of the traffic stop
requires a test that is particularly easy to apply. This note proposes that the
nature of the questioning should be focused, so that if an officer's
questioning goes beyond the scope of the stop then the Miranda rights must
be given.
The Court defined custody in Miranda as the deprivation of a person's
freedom of action in any significant way, which is a rather vague and easy-
to-attain standard.116 As the Court admitted in Oregon v. Mathiason in
response to confusion about the Miranda standard, "[a]ny interview of one
suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it,
simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law
enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged
with a crime."117 The Court later clarified the standard for custody by
stating that custody occurs when there is an arrest or a curtailment of one's
freedom of movement to the degree that is associated with being
arrested. 1 8 That proposition leads to the hallmark of the formal arrest test.
A. The Hallmark of the Formal Arrest Test
The analysis begins with the proposition that the utilization of a hallmark
of a formal arrest will give rise to custody because it creates a restraint on
freedom associated with that of a formal arrest.1 19 It should be a rather
simple analysis, then, but the expansion of the Terry stop has confused it by
allowing police to utilize some of the hallmarks of a formal arrest when
they reasonably fear for their safety.120 Handcuffs are one of the hallmarks
of a formal arrest. 121 Other hallmarks of a formal arrest are drawn guns,
114 See, e.g., Swift, supra note 8, at 1080 (detailing several different factors that have been taken
into account by courts in determining custody).
115 See generally Berkemer, 468 U.S.
116 See Swift, supra note 8, at 1078 (indicating that when it defined custody in Miranda, the Court
"did not articulate the indicia of custody, or otherwise help courts (or police) to determine the steps
leading up to custody"); Bufkin, supra note 110, at 199 (proffering that the uncertainty surrounding in-
custody determinations is based on the "lack of clear direction" from the Supreme Court).
117 See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (holding that "Miranda warnings are
required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's fteedom as to render him 'in
custody"').
118 See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (referring to the question of whether
there has been a formal arrest or restraint as the ultimate inquiry).
119 Id. (holding that a formal arrest or restraint equal to it creates custody).
120 See Godsey, supra note 20, at 723 (stating that when it was decided, Terry called for "brief
investigatory detention").
121 Id. at 719. (claiming that handcuffs are generally considered to be a hallmark of a formal
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the forcing of a suspect out of his car, and the forcing of a suspect onto the
ground.122
A reasonable Terry stop will not immediately give rise to custody.123
However, the Terry stop was devised as a brief intrusion so that an officer
could dispel his suspicions that a person might be armed. 124 The Terry
stop, then, is an exception to the hallmark of a formal arrest rule when an
officer is "warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in
danger." 25 The officer may utilize a hallmark of formal arrest briefly so
that he may establish control of the situation. 126 Upon establishing control
of the situation, the officer must then either cease to utilize the hallmark, or
recite the Miranda warning to the individual if he plans to question her.
a. Application of the Hallmark of the Formal Arrest Test
An example would be if an officer spotted a man who matched the
description of an armed bank robber, and drew his gun on the man while
telling him to stop. This is a reasonable Terry stop, as it is reasonable for
the officer to believe that the man may be armed and dangerous.1 27 Upon
frisking the man, if the officer were to find no weapon, he would have then
established that the man was not a danger to him and could thus cease
utilizing the hallmark of a formal arrest, the drawn gun, because the Terry
stop exception had ended.128 If the officer ceases to use his gun, the
individual has not been placed into custody.
If he continues to point the gun at the suspect, and then questions him,
those questions would be custodial. The suspect would be subject to a
curtailment of his freedom associated with arrest, and there would no
arrest).
122 See United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455,1464-65 (10th Cir. 1993) (calling "the use of guns to
force a suspect off the road, out of his car, and onto the ground" police action that is more associated
with formal arrest than with the typical Terry stop).
123 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (comparing the routine traffic stop to a
Terry stop, and concluding that the traffic stop does not automatically warrant a Miranda warning); see
also United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 130-31 (4th Cir. 1998).
124 See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438-39 (finding that the routine traffic stop is similar to Terry
because it is temporary, brief, and does not leave the individual at the mercy of the police); see United
States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2004).
125 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
126 See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464; Butkin, supra note t 10, at 201 (describing situations in which
police must sometimes utilize hallmarks of arrest to ensure their own safety and that of any bystanders)
127 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (holding that the detective in Terry was justified in his search because
the crime he suspected Terry of was one that normally included a weapon).
128 Id., at 29 ("The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the
police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably
designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police
officer.").
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longer be a reason to support the officer's pointing of the gun.129
b. The Godsey Analysis of a Custody Test
This portion of the test meets the three standards espoused by Godsey for
a good test of custody.130 First, it protects civil liberties and enforces the
Constitution because it prevents the questioning of citizens who are in
custody who have not been Mirandized.131 Custody is established by the
hallmark of a formal arrest, and the Fifth Amendment right against self
incrimination is protected by requiring Miranda in such a situation, lest the
evidence obtained by such questioning be dismissed.132
The hallmark of the formal arrest test also does this without undermining
law enforcement because it allows officers the chance to utilize the most
effective means to stabilize a situation. 133 Once a situation is stable, it then
reinforces the rights of citizens by removing the shadow of arrest. 134 This
test is also easy to apply in real world situations; an officer can use the
means necessary to establish that he can safely speak to a citizen in an
uncoercive environment, or he can decide that the situation requires
continued use of a hallmark of arrest and thus any interrogation must be
preceded by Miranda.13 5
129 See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (declaring that restraint equal formal
arrest creates custody); Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 ("The sole justification of the search in the present
situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in
scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments
for the assault of the police officer.").
130 See Godsey, supra note 20, at 734 (giving the first of three factors that can be used to determine
if a custody test is practicable).
131 Id. (explaining the first factor). Cf United States v. Perdue, No. 91-40052-01, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8508, at *5-7 (D. Kan. May 1, 1992) (unpublished), rev'd in part, 8 F.3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir.
1993) (holding that Miranda rights are never implicated in Terry stops, a ruling that was then reversed
by the Tenth circuit).
132 See Godsey, supra note 20, at 717 (stating that Miranda warnings "were designed to counteract
the inherently compelling and intimidating pressures of police custodial interrogation"); See Catherine
L. Guzelian, Note, Following the Flag: The Application of The Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause and the Miranda Warnings to Overseas Confessions, 3 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 341, 343 (2005)
(declaring the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination is protected by barring any statements
given prior to a Miranda warning at trial).
133 See U.S. v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464-65 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding police conduct that would
ensure an officer's safety most effectively, such as drawn guns and forcing a suspect onto the ground, is
akin to a formal arrest); see Godsey, supra note 20, at 715 (stating "these types of force are often
considered to place a suspect in police 'custody' and thereby necessitate Miranda warnings").
134 See Godsey, supra note 20, at 733-34 (listing a second factor in the three factor custody test);
see also, United States v. Brady, 819 F.2d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a formal arrest has a
degree of restraint which can include being stopped at gunpoint and or handcuffed).
135 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (asserting that the Miranda warning must be
given before custodial interrogations); see also, Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428, 431-32, 443 (2000)
(reaffirming Miranda's ruling that certain warnings must be given before one is put into custody to
have any statements made by them admissible).
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B. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
The Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination was designed to
protect citizens from being coerced into giving up information that could
incriminate them.136 Even in the absence of a hallmark of formal arrest, a
person may be subject to interrogation in a coercive environment. 137 Right
now some courts use a totality of the circumstances test to determine if an
environment in which a person was interrogated was coercive, but there are
a multitude of factors and courts do not seem to agree on how much weight
to give each one, or even which ones to use. 138
The totality of the circumstances test is a reasonable test that seeks to
protect the rights of citizens, but at the moment, with all of the differences
between courts, it does not seem to lend itself to easy application.1 39 The
test must be streamlined and given some structure.
a. Current Factors
Currently, the factors courts look at include, the location of the
questioning, the number of officers, the degree of physical restraint used to
detain the suspect, the duration and character of the interrogation, the
language used to summon the suspect, the extent to which the suspect is
confronted with evidence of guilt; and whether the suspect initiated contact
with the police.140
b. Weighing the Factors in an Effort to Streamline
Several of the factors would seem to lend themselves to a heavier
weighting when trying to determine if a person was in custody. Those
would be the factors that are directly related to the restraint imposed on the
136 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (stating that the Fifth Amendment protects the privilege of an
individual not to incriminate himself).
137 See U.S. v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding custody in a situation that lacked
any of the hallmarks of a formal arrest as they have been defined in this note).
138 See Swift, supra note 8, at 1080 (declaring"[c]ourts do not agree on which factors to consider;
courts do not even agree on the weight to give individual factors."); see also Kim, 292 F.3d at 973
(listing five factors which may be relevant to deciding whether a person was in custody, none of which
are dispositive).
139 See United States v. Hemandez-Hemandez, 327 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that a
court must examine all the circumstances surrounding an interrogation); Swift, supra note 8, at 1080-81
(claiming that the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the difficulty that lies in determining
custody).
140 See United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 93 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting relevant circumstances
courts take into account to determine custody); Swift, supra note 8, at 1080 (listing factors taken into
account by different courts when determining custody).
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citizen. 141 Other factors do not seem nearly as important in determining
whether a person was subject to questioning in a coercive environment. 142
As such, those factors should not be held to be as important, if held at all,
in determining whether there was custody.
1. Factors to be Accorded More Weight
The factors that should be given heavier weight are the location of the
questioning, the degree of physical restraint used to detain the suspect, the
duration of the interrogation, and the character of the interrogation.143 The
number of police is superfluous and could be considered a part of the
degree of the restraint. 144 Those that do not seem as weighty are the
language used to summon the suspect, the extent to which the suspect is
confronted with evidence of guilt, and whether the suspect initiated contact
with the police.145
Once again, the definition for custody used by the Court in Miranda was
the deprivation of a person's freedom in any significant way. 146 When
attempting to determine if someone's freedom has been curtailed in a
significant way, the actual physical restraint and the amount of time the
person is held should be the most important factors. 147 The character of the
interrogation is also important because it factors into the analysis of
whether the interrogation was coercive. 148 These factors are the heaviest
141 See United States v. Martin 95 Fed. Appx. 169, 177 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing restraints
involved during an arrest); Swift, supra note 8, at 1091-92 (determining that there is a difference in the
degree of physical restraint in cases in which custody is found and those in which it is not found).
142 See United States v. Martin 95 Fed. Appx. at 177 (stating neither the length nor the place of
question weigh in favor of detention as custodial interrogation); Swift, supra note 8, at 1091-92.
(asserting that the only relevant factors when determining if there is custody are duration and restraint).
143 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 (1984) (differentiating a routine traffic stop
from a custodial interrogation by stating that a routine traffic stop is temporary, brief, and does not
leave the motorist at the mercy of the police).
144 See United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1150 (1Ith Cir. 2004) (noting motorists are usually
detained by at most two police officers); Swift, supra note 8, at 1093-94 (arguing that the number of
officers should be incorporated into the restraint evaluation because the presence of multiple officers
lends itself to the belief that if needed, the suspect could be physically restrained).
145 See United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2002) (listing the factors among those to
be relevant to determine if a person would believe he or she was not free to leave); Swift, supra note 8
at 1092-93 (stating those factors are ambiguous, subjective, and serve to confuse the analysis of custody
more than aid it).
146 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."); see also Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492, 494 (1977) (applying the Miranda standard of custody to questioning that takes place in a
prison setting).
147 See Swift, supra note 8, at 1089 (asserting that the only factors relevant to the question of
custody are the degree of restraint and the duration).
148 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 (acknowledging that coercion can be mental as well as physical,
and in modem interrogations it often is); see also Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)
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and thus should represent the initial analysis of the totality of the
circumstances test. Courts should look at these factors first.
In determining if a person's freedom was curtailed, it is important to
determine to what extent the person is physically restrained from
leaving. 149 It should be noted that it is not necessary to discuss any of the
hallmarks of a formal arrest because in the context of this note, if a
hallmark is present, then the custody analysis does not reach the totality of
the circumstances test. That means that handcuffs are not a part of this
analysis.150 So then the other ways a person's freedom may be curtailed
would apply.151 Essentially, if a person is not free to leave, then her
freedom is curtailed, no matter how that effect is achieved. 152 A locked
room is a curtailment of a person's freedom because they cannot leave.153
An open door that is blocked by an officer is again a significant curtailment
because the placement of the officer implies that the person would not be
able to leave without permission of the officer. More officers multiplies
that effect; that is why the number of officers present should be looked at
as a part of the physical restraint on the person, because the greater the
number of officers, the less likely a person will feel they are free to
leave. 154
The location of the questioning should be considered as part of the
degree of restraint. 155 A person will not feel as free to leave a police station
(explaining that coercion can be both mental as well as physical).
149 See Kim, 292 F.3d at 977-78 (taking into account the position of the officers and the fact that
the officers surrounded the suspect in a way that created the impression the suspect was not free to
leave); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (explaining that when
determining whether a person was free to leave, the court should look at the circumstances surrounding
the incident, including the threatening presence of several officers).
150 See U.S. v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding handcuffs to be a hallmark of a
formal arrest); see also U.S. v. Polanco, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6341 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that
handcuffing has generally been described as the hallmark of a formal arrest).
151 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (defining custody as a deprivation of freedom in a significant
way); see also U.S. v. Flores, 193 Fed. Appx. 597, 601 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the defendant was
not in custody because there was no deprivation of his freedom in any substantial way during
questioning).
152 See Kim, 292 F.3d at 977-78 (stating that it did not matter whether the officers intended to
create the impression that the suspect was not free to leave); see also U.S. v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 576
n. 2 (1992) (explaining that the officer's subjective intent is only relevant to the extent it was conveyed
to the person confronted).
153 Burkholder v. Newton, 115 Fed. Appx. 358, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that taking
someone into a locked room to be questioned is a curtailment of a person's freedom); see Swift, supra
note 8, at 1095 (declaring, while conceding it is debatable, that being locked in a room is more
restraining than being in handcuffs because you cannot run out of a locked room, whereas you can run
while wearing handcuffs).
154 Kim, 292 F.3d at 977-78 (taking into account both the number of officers and their placement in
the room in which the questioning took place); Swift, supra note 8, at 1093-94 ("Multiple officers
imply physical force in a way that a single agent would not.").
155 Kim, 292 F.3d at 974 (listing "the physical surroundings of the interrogation" as a relevant
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as he would a street corner. 156 When questioning takes place indoors it
immediately adds to the idea that there is custody because a person will not
feel as free to leave when they are indoors.15 7
The duration is also an important aspect of the determination. 15 s The
longer a person is kept somewhere, the greater the curtailment on his
freedom. A person's time is his own, and when it is spent doing something
that the person would not have been doing, it has effectively been taken
from him. 159 The longer a person is kept, the greater the chance that the
questioning took place while the person was in a degree of physical
restraint that imposed custody.160 In order to keep somebody for a long
time, there must be some sort of restraint to keep them.
The nature of the interrogation is also important in determining if the
person was interrogated in a coercive environment. 161 The very nature of
the Fifth Amendment is to protect citizens from being coerced into
incriminating themselves, and certain police tactics could be coercive if the
citizen is not informed of his rights. 162 The extent to which the suspect is
confronted with evidence of guilt is a part of the analysis of the nature of
factor to be considered); see Swift, supra note 8, at 1092 (arguing that it is not the location itself that is
important, but the way in which the location restrains the suspect that is).
156 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461 ("An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police
custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion ... cannot be
otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated
setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where
there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery."); see also Swift, supra
note 8, at 1096 (explaining that if a person is involuntarily taken to a police station the Court will not
require an extended duration of detention in order for the situation to be deemed custodial).
157 See U.S. v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that in circumstances where the
suspect is placed in an isolated, nonpublic room, she will not feel as free to leave); see also Swift, supra
note 8, at 1096 (explaining that if a person is involuntarily taken into a private, locked room the Court
will not require an extended duration of detention in order for the situation to be deemed custodial).
158 Kim, 292 F.3d at 981 (considering the duration of the detention); see Swift, supra note 8, at
1091 (noting that most, if not all, custody cases will look at the time of the restraint when determining
custody).
159 See Kim, 292 F.3d at 981 (finding a detention of about 90 minutes too high); see also Swift,
supra note 8, at 1090 (stating that the duration of detention must be brief).
160 Swift, supra note 8, at 1091 ("[T]he fact that most cases do emphasize the length of the
detention suggests that it is an important factor"); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42 ("Only a
short period of time elapsed between the stop and arrest. At no point during that interval was respondent
informed that his detention would not be temporary... Treatment of this sort cannot fairly be
characterized as the functional equivalent of formal arrest").
161 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 (1966) (stating that not all coercion is physical); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 239 (1940) (noting that non-physical methods that produce coerced confessions
violate due process).
162 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 ("We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely"); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299 (1980) ("This is not to
say, however, that all statements obtained by the police after a person has been taken into custody are to
be considered the product of interrogation).
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the interrogation.1 63 Also considered in this part should be the presence of
other people around, because the presence of other people lessens the
chance for coercion, and will also keep a person at ease.164
2. Factors to be Disregarded
The other two factors should not be given much weight in determining
whether there was custody. If a suspect voluntarily approaches the police,
there is not custody.165 On the other hand, whether a suspect was
interrogated involuntarily would factor into either the degree of the
restraint imposed, the nature of the interrogation, or both. The language
used to summon the suspect is not a factor that should be considered on its
own, but rather as a part of the nature of the interrogation, specifically as
the way the interrogation was initiated.166
c. Application of the Streamlined Totality Test
An example of a case in which the totality of the circumstances case
would lead to custody would be a person stopped by two police officers in
a store in the mall and brought to a back office for questioning. The degree
of restraint would be high because there are two officers, alone with the
person in a room with one exit. The person would not feel free to leave.167
Time would not be as important, but the longer the police kept the person
there, the greater the presumption of custody. Thus any interrogation by
the officers should be preceded by the Miranda warning.168
Applying this test, custody would not be found in a case where a person
was stopped in the middle of a crowded mall. In this situation, there would
163 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450 (describing one manual for interrogation techniques as instructing
officers that "[t]he guilt of the subject is to be posited as a fact"); see also State v. Pitts, 936 So.2d 1111,
1124 (2006) (noting that one of the four factors employed as a guide for determining whether a suspect
is in custody for purposes of Miranda is the extent to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of
his or her guilt).
164 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450 (according to one manual, allowing others to be around the suspect
during questioning could embolden him as the others may lend moral support); Missouri v. Werner, 9
S.W.3d 590, 595 (2000) (stating that one indicia of custody includes whether the atmosphere was police
dominated).
165 See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (finding that there was no custody where a
suspect came to the police station voluntarily); see also Werner, 9 S.W.3d at 595 (2000) (stating that
one indicia of custody includes whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily
acquiesced to official requests to answer questions).
166 See U.S. v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2002) (taking into account the language used to
summon the suspect); U.S. v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F. 2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that the
language used to summon the individual is relevant to whether an accused is in custody).
167 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (1966) (defining custody as a deprivation of freedom in a
significant way).
168 Id. (stating that custodial interrogations must be preceded by procedural safeguards).
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not be as much of a feeling that the person cannot leave because they are
out in the open area of the mall, and there are people around. 169 If the
police kept the person for a long time then there would be custody, but
again that would require some restraint.
d. The Godsey Analysis of a Custody Test
The totality of the circumstances portion of the test meets the three
factors of a good test of custody stated in the Godsey piece.170 The test had
always protected the rights of citizens and enforced the constitution by
looking at all of the circumstances in an interrogation situation and
determining if there was custody. 171 The problem with the test was that, in
doing so, it undermined law enforcement because it required them to
essentially guess as to what factors would be considered important in a
situation, and then whether those factors were enough to be considered
custody.172 It made law enforcement gamble, because by Mirandizing
suspects, they would get less information, but if they did not, the
information they did obtain could be inadmissible in court. 173 The reason it
undermined law enforcement was mainly because it was difficult to apply
in real world situations.174 This version of the test had made that easier for
law enforcement. It has cut down on the number of factors to consider, and
weighted them so that officers know which factors are more important than
others.175
C. A Unique Situation: The Routine Traffic Stop
a. The Traffic Stop
The traffic stop is the most common interaction between citizens and law
enforcement officers.176 It is unique in that it is an interaction with law
169 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984) (distinguishing the routine traffic stop
from a custodial interrogation based on the fact the traffic stop is public and can be viewed by people
passing by).
170 See Godsey, supra note 20, at 734 (1994).
171 See Kim, 292 F.3d at 973 (taking into account the totality of the circumstances to find custody).
172 See Swift, supra note 8, at 1080 (calling the multifactor nature of the totality of the
circumstances test a "grab bag" that made custody cases "unpredictable and inconsistent").
173 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (1966) ("[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination.").
174 See Godsey, supra note 20, at 741 (arguing that a test that is too difficult for officers to apply in
real world situations will result in confusion and overturned convictions).
175 See id. at 734.
176 See American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association, The Traffic Stop, available at:
930
HERE 1NMY CAR
enforcement, but it rarely ends in arrest. 177 They are usually brief, and there
is an expectation on the citizen's part that if he cooperates, he will, at
worst, be fined and be on his way.1 78
The Court ruled, in Berkemer, that the routine traffic stop was more akin
to a Terry stop than to custody for purposes of Miranda.179 It did, however,
preserve the possibility of custody in the routine traffic stop.180 It is not
clear, however, what constitutes custody in the context of the routine traffic
stop.181
1. The Possibility of Custody
The Court acknowledged that the physical circumstances of a traffic stop
are similar to custody in that the freedom of action of the driver and
passengers are significantly curtailed. 182 In Berkemer, the Court declined to
extend Miranda to all traffic stops, but left the question of custody in the
context of the traffic stop open, and stated that "a motorist who has been
detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter [who has been] subjected to
treatment that renders him 'in custody' for practical purposes .. . will be
entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda." 83
2. Similarity to the Terry Stop
The Court likens traffic stops to Terry stops and states that "the officer
may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his
identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the
officer's suspicions." 84 Such information in the context of a traffic stop
would rarely include information about a specific and serious crime. The
http://www.adtsea.iup.edu/adtsealarticles/Article.aspx?ArticlelD-7b876663-3cfe-4254-a946-
dbc38805d8c6 (last visited November 30, 2008).
177 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438 n. 26 (1984) (explaining that a motorist subject to
a routine traffic stop will not be arrested unless she "is accused of a specified serious crime, refuses to
promise to appear in court, or demands to be taken before a magistrate").
178 Id at 437-38 (acknowledging that a motorist who is stopped expects to be stopped briefly and
then be on his way).
179 Id. at 438-39 (reasoning that the atmosphere of a traffic stop is less "police dominated" than the
type of interrogation at issue in Miranda).
180 Id. at 440 (stating that a motorist will be entitled to the protections of Miranda if she is
rendered in custody after being stopped).
181 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8 at 7 (citing the struggle of both courts and
commentators to establish a reasonable rule on custody in the context of cases that touch on both the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
182 See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436 ("It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop
significantly curtails the 'freedom of action' of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained
vehicle.").
183 Id. at 440.
184 Id. at 439.
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Court also noted that "[t]he brevity and spontaneity of an ordinary traffic
stop also reduces the danger that the driver through subterfuge will be
made to incriminate himself." 85 That is precisely why Miranda should
apply to questions asked about specific and serious crimes in the context of
the routine traffic stop; because of the motorist's expectations, it is a form
of subterfuge to ask him questions about a specific and serious crime.
3. Traffic Stops Do Not Normally End in Arrest
Traffic stops do not normally end in arrest. The only reasons a traffic
stop will end in arrest are "the driver is accused of a specific, serious crime,
the driver refuses to appear in court, or the driver demands to be taken
before a magistrate."1 86 In the context of the routine stop, an officer does
not need to ask questions that go beyond the scope of the infraction for
which the driver was stopped. Drivers do not expect to be accused of
specific, serious crimes.187 If, however, a driver is accused of a specific,
serious crime, then the driver should be given the Miranda warning.188
4. There are Certain Expectations Associated With a Stop
This rule would apply only to routine traffic stops, because of the
expectations of the driver. Drivers do not expect to be arrested as a result
of a routine stop, and thus their guard is down when they are questioned
during the stop.189 It would be unfair to allow officers to question drivers
about greater offenses without Mirandizing them because the questioning
happened to take place during a routine stop. Allowing this would violate
the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. 190 This rule would be
applied before the standard custody tests espoused above, for this rule is in
addition to those tests, not in lieu of them.
It is for these reasons that the routine traffic stop is unique, and the
question of when there is custody during a routine traffic stop must be
addressed.191
185 Id. at 438 n.27.
186 Id. at 438 n.26.
187 Id. at 437-38 (describing drivers' expectations as being able to leave soon after being stopped).
188 Id. at 438 n.26 (stating that an accusation of a specific, serious crime is one of three reasons a
motorist might get arrested).
189 Id. at 437-438 (asserting that drivers expect nothing more than a citation in the context of a
routine traffic stop).
190 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that officers must ensure that
procedural safeguards are in place before subjecting a suspect to custodial interrogation).
191 Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437-38 (explaining why the Miranda rights are so important).
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b. The Case of Richard Snell
In holding that the traffic stop is more like a Terry stop, the Court
acknowledged that there is the possibility that officers could ask questions
during the stop that could lead to an arrest for something unrelated to the
stop before reading the Miranda rights.192 This is exactly what happened in
New Mexico v. Snell.
In Snell, a man driving along the highway crashed into a car head-on on
a cold night.193 It was so cold that there was ice and snow on the ground.194
One of the people involved in the accident died as a result of her
injuries.195 When the police came to the accident scene, the man attempted
to interject while an officer questioned the third party involved in the
accident.196 The officer told the man to stop interfering or he would be
arrested, and then another officer brought him to the patrol car and placed
him in the back.197 While the man was in the back of the patrol car, he was
questioned about the accident.198 His answers to those questions eventually
led to a charge of vehicular homicide.199
At trial, the man, Snell, argued that his Fifth Amendment rights were
violated because he was not read his Miranda rights before the questioning
in the back of the patrol car. 200 The trial court agreed that he was in custody
for purposes of Miranda, based upon the cautionary language of
Berkemer.201 The court of appeals agreed as well. 202 The state argued that
routine traffic stops are more like Terry stops, and the questioning was a
part of the brief, investigatory questioning allowed under the Terry stop.203
The courts disagreed, and utilized a totality of the circumstances test to
determine that as a result of the officer telling Snell if he did not stop
interfering he would be arrested, the placing of Snell in the car, and the
questioning while either the doors were locked or Snell's exit was blocked,
there was custody.204
192 Id. at 441 (showing that there is a possibility for officer discretion).
193 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8 at 3 (explaining the facts of the case).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id
197 Id. at 3-4.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id. (stating that Snell moved to suppress the statements made in the back of the patrol car and
any fruits of that interrogation).
201 Id. at 4 (citing the district court's decision to grant Snell's motion to suppress).
202 Id. at 5.
203 Id. at 25 (stating that the Miranda warning is not required during a brief investigatory stop).
204 Id at 26 (holding that the New Mexico state courts wrongly decided the case because they
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The New Mexico courts reached the correct conclusion, but this note
proposes that a different approach should have been used to reach that
result. As stated earlier, traffic stops are unique. In the context of the
routine traffic stop, motorists expect to be pulled over, asked to hand over
license and registration, maybe get briefly questioned about the infraction,
receive a ticket, and be finished. 205 This expectation causes motorists to
lower their guard, opening them up to subterfuge. 206 That is why traffic
stops should have their own rules to apply to custody.
c. Application of Proposed Traffic Stop Test to Snell
In the case of Snell, application of this principle would have rendered the
questions asked of Snell in the patrol car inadmissible because of the
presence of the specific, more serious offense.207 To hold otherwise would
allow the state of New Mexico to essentially take advantage of the
understanding of a citizen that traffic stops do not normally result in arrests,
and that if one is going to, motorists deserve the procedural protections
provided by the Miranda warning.208
d. The Godsey Analysis of a Custody Test
This rule also meets the three standards for an effective rule in the
Godsey piece.209 This rule protects civil liberties and enforces the
Constitution because it requires the state to provide motorists with extra
protection against self incrimination that would otherwise not be present in
the context of a stop. 210 Nor does this rule undermine law enforcement
efforts.211 When an officer stops a motorist, the expectation is most likely
the same as that of the motorist, a brief stop ending in a ticket.212 This rule
does not affect that outcome in any way; it only requires that when there is
a greater, more serious crime present, if the officer is going to ask questions
instigated an overly broad 5th Amendment analysis).
205 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 (1984) (describing the expectation of the
motorist caught in a routine stop as a brief detention ending with a traffic citation).
206 Id at 438 n.27 ("The brevity and spontaneity of an ordinary traffic stop also reduces the danger
that the driver through subterfuge will be made to incriminate himself.").
207 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8 at 4.
208 Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (reassuring observers that if a motorist is treated in such a way that
creates custody, the protections of Miranda will apply).
209 Godsey, supra note 20, at 234 (setting out three standards by which to judge custody tests).
210 Id (listing the first step of the analysis as how well "it protects civil liberties and enforces the
Constitution").
211 Id (noting the second step as "how effectively it [protects civil liberties and enforces the
Constitution] without substantially undermining law enforcement efforts").
212 Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438 (finding that the detention of a "motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is
presumptively temporary and brief").
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that could lead to incriminatory answers, the Miranda warning must be
given. Just because a person is in their car does not mean they should be
denied the protections of Miranda.213 This rule is also not difficult for
officers to apply in the field. An officer knows why he has pulled a person
over, and there are only so many reasons that an officer can pull a person
over while driving. 214 Those reasons must be visible to the officer from his
automobile. Even if an officer hears over his radio that a certain make and
model of car has been stolen, he must see that the car he is pulling over
matches the description given over the radio. So questions that go beyond
the scope of the normal reasons for a traffic stop can only be asked after the
giving of the Miranda warning. 215
CONCLUSION
It is very important that courts come to a conclusion about when a person
is placed in custody for the purposes of the Miranda warning. The warning
is an integral part of our justice system in that it provides notice to citizens
of the protections of the Constitution. That said, it is also important that
law enforcement officers understand the situations in which they must
utilize the warning. Both because it allows them to investigate more
efficiently by knowing when the warning is not required, and because it
protects citizens from police coercion.
The hallmark of a formal arrest test fits that bill by providing citizens
protection when necessary, and giving officers an easy to apply standard
for when to give the warning. It is important to remember that custody can
still be attained in the absence of a hallmark of a formal arrest, and that is
where the totality of the circumstances test enters the picture. It also
provides protection to citizens, and with the leaner, less confusing version
proposed in this note, provides officers with an easy to understand and
apply rule for custody. Finally, routine traffic stops are unique, and do not
normally require the protections of Miranda, but there are certainly
situations in which Miranda may become necessary. The rules proposed in
this note, that Miranda becomes necessary once the questioning turns to a
crime that is outside the scope of the stop that is more serious and specific,
provides Miranda to motorists when it is necessary while not putting a
213 Id. at 440 (holding that the conduct of police can render motorists in custody).
214 See American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association, supra note 13 (stating there are
a variety of reasons a motorist may be stopped).
215 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (proposing that officers must warn
individuals of their rights before beginning a custodial interrogation).
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burden on police.
